


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Psychoanalysis of Japan”

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*Proceedings of the Midwest Association for
Japanese Literary Studies* 4 (1998): 2–18.



PMAJLS 4:
The New Historicism and Japanese Literary Studies.
Ed. Eiji Sekine.

A Geopolitics of Literation—Toward a Psychoanalysis of Japan

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(1)

After World War II, Japanese intellectuals could resume their historical reflection only by asking why their predecessors couldn't resist fascism and war. This wasn't simply a matter of ethical self-critique, but a must for understanding Japanese social and cultural structure. Among those who approached the question, Maruyama Masao was quickest and most penetrating. Instead of associating the nature of the Japanese prewar state with fascism in general, he analyzed it in contradistinction to Nazi Germany. While in Nazism there was a clear volition and subject, that is, a responsibility, he saw no such thing in Japanese leaders of war. In the Japanese power structure, there was and is no identifiable subject of the voluntary act, no subject to take responsibility; accordingly, events are considered to have occurred as a spontaneous chain: A leads to B leads to C. Maruyama called this a "system of irresponsibility," identifying it as *the* structural characteristic of the *Tennō* system.¹ Where did it come from? Fascism unequivocally comes into existence at times of crisis in contemporary capitalism; however, inasmuch as the origin of the Japanese power structure, Japanese fascism, is at stake, one has to return to the historical substructure dating from the pre-Meiji era.

Maruyama thus scrutinized Japanese intellectual history since ancient times, and pointed out the enduring absence of a principle

¹ Maruyama Masao, "Nihon Shihaisō no Sensō Sekinin" (The War Responsibility of Japanese Ruling Class), *Maruyama Masao Shū*, Bekkan (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1956).

that functions as a coordinate axis for various thoughts. That is to say that there is no orthodoxy that marks and excludes heresy; all imported thoughts are indiscriminately accepted into a space of cohabitation. And, because there is no confrontation between principles, neither is there a development nor an accumulation of thought. Without any sense of repression, imported thoughts merely cohabit spatially, stored without confrontation and judgment until one is suddenly taken up when appropriate.² Japan seems to have warehoused everything in this manner. As Okakura Tenshin, an aesthete from the Meiji era, said, Japan is a "reservoir" and "museum" of the whole of Asian civilization.³ According to Maruyama, the only imported thought that left a lasting impression was Marxism. Christianity, on the other hand, had attracted many intellectuals during the Meiji era, but the mass conversion barely left a ripple. Marxism, which permeated the intellectual community in the 1920s and was then oppressed, left an almost religious trauma in those who had converted. Marxism produced Existentialism, as it were.

In a sense, Maruyama analyzed Japanese intellectual history only in contradistinction to that of Germany. On the other hand, Takeuchi Yoshimi, a critic and scholar of Chinese literature, analyzed it in contradistinction to Asian nations. While in most of Asia, and China in particular, the encounter with the modern West was fiercely resisted, in Japan there was no such reaction and modernization proceeded smoothly. In Japan there was no 'subject' to call for resistance. That is to say that the existence of a coordinate axis causes stagnation, either temporary or extensive, rather than development. According to Takeuchi, the secret of

² Maruyama, *Nihon no Shisō* (Japanese Thoughts), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1961).

³ Okakura Kakuzo (Tenshin), *The Book of Tea* (1906; reprinted, Rutland, Vt. and Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1956).

Japan's rapid progress was the absence of subject and principle.⁴ But why?

The resolution of this riddle became the assignment for all Japanese thinkers, not only Maruyama and Takeuchi. This question, however, was different from the analysis of *Nihon Bunka Ron* [Study of Japanese Cultural Peculiarities], most of which emphasized the uniqueness of Japanese culture according to arbitrary measures. At least Maruyama et. al did not ask that kind of question. Rather, they followed the pre-war Marxists—especially of the *Kōza* faction—who recognized that political and cultural superstructure function in relative autonomy from the economic infrastructure. Although the structure of the *Tennō* system was established in the modern constitution in the Meiji era, its roots are ancient.

Maruyama attempted to capture the essence of Japanese thinking in the ancient substratum by analyzing *Kojiki* [the Ancient Record]. Simply said, what he detected in the text was an attribute that values becoming over artifice/making, which was for Maruyama equal to “Shintō.” He wrote, “Shintō, just like a long cloth tube, interwove itself with various religions that happened to be powerful in each era and filled the disciplinary gap. This limitless embrace and ideological cohabitation of Shintō epitomizes the tradition of Japanese thinking.”⁵ Though his methodology was different, his findings were nonetheless the very same as those Motoori Norinaga—the *Kokugaku* [national studies] scholar of the Edo period whom Maruyama criticized—had described positively as purely Japanese, distinct from the Chinese spirit [*kara-gokoro*]. In the end, Maruyama

⁴ Takeuchi Yoshimi, *Kindai no Chōkoku* (Overcoming the Modern), Chikuma Shobō, 1983.

⁵ Maruyama, “Nihon Shihaisō no Sensō Sekinin.”

simply interpreted what was positive for Motoori negatively. After all, retrospection to ancient times, even if designed from the left, in the end tends to structurally merge into the nationalist project. The common trap in returning to the past is to assume a consistent autonomy within national history, considering its rapport with the external world as contingent and secondary. In the final analysis, Western history, too, was constructed in the same way—as if the West were one self-same entity without external and internal differences.

According to Maruyama, Western thinking has arranged itself according to a coordinate axis of principle. For a certain length of time this was true, but it was not always so. F.M. Cornford argued that in ancient Greece, “becoming” was the dominant view of the world, while the Platonic idea that “the world was made” was secondary.⁶ This creationist view of the world was introduced from the more advanced Egyptian Empire. If so, what was the dominant world view in European nations before they encountered Judeo-Christianity? In the substratum of history, “becoming” must have been more dominant than “making.” After Christianity was introduced, becoming was repressed. The same was true in Asia: the minor nations around empires such as India and China thoroughly repressed the previous trend of heterodoxy as they introduced Indian and Chinese cultural and political influences.

It was not a uniquely Japanese characteristic that becoming was more dominant than making in the historical substratum; the same was true of minor nations world over. Therefore, it is not sufficient to point out the existence of the substratum of becoming, but one has to question why the substratum of becoming was not repressed in Japan in particular. In this

⁶ F.M. Cornford, *The Unwritten Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, 1967

problematic it is fruitless to explain Japanese characteristics in reference to India and China, like Takeuchi did. Instead we have to look to Korea to shed light on the Japanness. Though Korea, too, undoubtedly once, long ago in its ancient substratum, held a view of the world based upon becoming, the Chinese systematic thinking has been so radically interiorized that the ancient layer is almost completely forgotten. As we shall see, this difference is part of the Far-Eastern geopolitical relationship between China, Korea, and Japan.

(2)

Here I would like to approach the difference between Korea and Japan by analyzing the writing system (*écriture*) that exists materially, rather than the imaginary constructs such as *Volksgeist* or national mentality. The writing system that came into existence in ancient times still functions today. Maruyama returned to ancient historiography in his attempt to elucidate the substratum of Japanese thinking, but when he analyzed the terminology of the text, *Kojiki*, he paid little attention to the *écriture* of the text. While he was concerned with the content, he did not problematize the form. In other words, he did not question the historicity of the *écriture* by which historiography is written. *Kojiki*, which is known to have been written in *man'yōgana*—phonetically reappropriated Chinese ideograms (*kanji*)—was in fact written after *Nihon Shoki* [The Chronicles of Japan], which had been written in Chinese. The idea of writing history had come from China and Korea. It is likely, therefore, that *Kojiki* was first written in Chinese and then translated into *Wago* [ancient Japanese]; this translation would have been impossible without *man'yōgana*.

The difference between Korea and Japan with respect to their confrontations with China is most explicit in the way they

introduced *kanji* into their own writing systems. The difference is not one among many, but the one through which all other differences are expressed, and the one that is presently producing every difference. In the ancient Far East, only China had letters. In China, culture—written in ideogram as ‘literation’ (turning to letters)—was equal to using *kanji*—the ideogram meaning *han*’s letter—and the *sine qua non* for marginal nations to develop culture was to first accept it for their own writing. However, it was difficult for nations whose languages are agglutinative to accept *kanji* from Chinese, which is an isolating language. *Kanji* is not a hieroglyph; it is both ideographic and phonogramic. Therefore, those nations that introduced Chinese *écriture* in ancient times adapted it intact, but used it phonetically to indicate their own languages. There are a number of languages that fabricated letters out of *kanji* within the Sino cultural sphere, including Annam, Sibō, Chi-dan, Nūzhen, or Korean Idu, and Japanese. It seems that the use of *man’yōgana*, that appeared around the 7th century in Japan and was used to write *Kojiki* and *Man’ yōshū* [The Selection of Ten Thousand Leaves], was invented in Korea. The phonetic use of *kanji* was brought to Japan by Korean immigrants: even its use in Japan seems to have been conceptualized by Korean immigrants. Then, around the 9th century, both the *kana* and *katakana* [the stylistically squared form of *kana*, used for transcribing foreign words] syllabaries were spontaneously developed by simplifying the phonetic use of *kanji* (*man’yōgana*) that had already been assimilated.

In Korea, the *hankul* alphabet that is used today was created in the 15th century. In Japanese the phonogram was developed spontaneously rather than designed: the phonetic syllabary, *kana*, was a transformation of *man’yōgana*—this was possible in part because Japanese has relatively few vowels and consonants, and is open-syllabic—all sounds end with vowels or diphthongs. In

contrast, in Korean there are many vowels and consonants, so that a method to combine them—like an alphabet—had to be designed. The most explicit difference between Japanese and Korean is that in Japanese, *kanji* is read two ways—phonetically [*on*], a reading that is similar to the Chinese sound, and semantically [*kun*], that is, a reading using native Japanese sounds, while in Korean, *kanji* is read only phonetically [*on*] in imitation of the Chinese sound, and never semantically. To be more precise, it is likely that in ancient Korea, *kanji* was also read semantically [*kun*], and this way of reading was imported to Japan. At the time when the *hankul* alphabet was designed, however, *kanji* was read only phonetically [*on*]. Furthermore, while the Japanese phonetic reading of Chinese adopted sounds of various Chinese dialects, Korean adopted only one way of reading. In the postwar era, both North and South Korea intended to reject Chinese ideograms and use only the *hankul* alphabet. They were able to drop *kanji* completely because the *hankul* alphabet can present *kanji*'s signification in one block/letter. In Japanese, if *kanji*'s sounds were all transcribed in *kana*, sentences would become too long for the economy of reading/writing.

What does this *kun* reading of *kanji* using Japanese native sound indicate? First and foremost, it assumes an internalization/translation of the foreign *écriture*, *kanji*. Today Japanese are not conscious that they are reading Chinese ideograms with their own sounds, rather they think that they express Japanese by using Chinese ideograms. For Koreans, *kanji* has the opposite sense: it remains external because it is read only in imitation of Chinese sounds [*on*]. Intellectuals persisted in reading and writing in the foreign *écriture*, *kanji*, even after the invention of the *hankul* alphabet. But in Japan, *écriture* of the *kanji/kana* mixture came to be standardized around the 12th

century, and Chinese writing came to be read/translated as/into Japanese. As a result, there were far fewer Japanese than Koreans who could write formal Chinese, but the literate population increased.

Second and more importantly, *kanji*, though absorbed into Japanese, remains something external. In Japanese, the part written in *kanji* is always deemed foreign and abstract. But beginning in the Meiji era, the cohabitation of native and foreign elements became much more complex. When Western concepts were translated into Japanese, they were first translated into Chinese ideograms (and this translation, the first importation of Western concepts into the Far East, permeated Korea, which was at that time colonized by Japan, and also China, taken there by innumerable Chinese students who were sent to study in Japan after the Sino-Japanese War), but were also transcribed by *katakana*. *Katakana* was appropriate for inscribing foreign words, having had been used as a support for reading Chinese texts, such as Buddhist sutras. These days Western concepts are rarely translated; they are mainly presented in *katakana* that indicates imitation of Western sounds. In speaking, the foreignness of foreign words does not come into consciousness, but in writing, the *katakana* syllabary makes the foreignness explicit. Insofar as they are written in *kanji* or *katakana*, the foreignness of imported terms is sustained. Terms written in *kanji* and *katakana* come to be imbued with a certain special value because of their foreignness, but at the same time they invite a certain repulsion. No matter to what extent these letters are domesticated into the system, and no matter how necessary they are for communication, they are tacitly and also materially discriminated from the domain of *Yamato kotoba* [authentic Japanese], the domain which is supposedly the most established and accordingly the most natural Japanese. But *Yamato kotoba* is not factually the most ancient,

original Japanese, rather it indicates words whose origin has been forgotten and which were therefore naturalized so as to be inscribed by *hiragana*.

Japanese is the only language whose *écriture* presents the origins of words explicitly by the distinction of letters: *kanji*, *hiragana*, and *katakana*. The tripartite division has been sustained for more than one thousand years. Without an understanding of this feature, one cannot understand Japanese political and cultural institutions, not to mention literature, because it is this *écriture* that has constructed them. Maruyama's argument that although many foreign trends of thinking are accepted in Japan they never interact so as to reveal potentially radical problematics of the internal core is precisely materialized in the system of letters. Those concepts that are introduced as *kanji* and *katakana* are automatically deemed foreign, that is, they have nothing to do with the Japanese cultural essence. It is thanks to this immune system that anything whatsoever can be introduced. Any foreign concept can be interiorized in Japanese without affecting the essential core, and thus accepted without causing resistance. There is no major confrontation between the same and the other. The foreign elements are put aside in the concessions. In this way, every foreign trend has been stored, intact, in Japan.

(3)

Concerning the problematic of Japanese *écriture*, I would like to invoke Jacques Lacan's account of Japan. Lacan seemed to have been enormously intrigued by the Japanese use of letters, and he wrote about it at least three times. In the preface for the Japanese translation of *Écrits*, he claimed that those who use letters like the Japanese do not need psychoanalysis, and he claimed that he hoped to make Japanese readers close the book after reading the

preface. What most interested Lacan was that Japanese read the Chinese *écriture*, *kanji*, with their own sounds [*kun*].

For humans who truly speak, *on-yomi* is convenient enough to annotate *kun-yomi*. Seeing the pair of pliers that joins them coming out hot like a freshly baked waffle, this is the true happiness of people made by them.

No other nation shares the luck of speaking Chinese within their own languages, unless they are dialects. More than anything else—and this point should be stressed—no other nation ever borrowed letters from a foreign language to the extent that they incessantly make palpable the distance from thinking to spoken language, namely, from unconscious to spoken language. When taken up among international languages that happen to be considered as appropriate for psychoanalysis, a knotty deviation might be discovered in the language. If I may say so, risking a possible misunderstanding, it is a daily affair for those who speak Japanese to tell the truth by the mediation of a lie, that is to say, without being a liar.⁷

By saying that "*on-yomi* is convenient enough to annotate *kun-yomi*" he meant that Japanese sound can be directly transferred to the use of *kanji*. In other words, aside from its sound, one can receive the meaning of *kanji* visually. From this Lacan drew the conclusion that Japanese did not need psychoanalysis, this seemingly based upon Freud's view of the unconscious as a hieroglyph. Psychoanalysis brings the unconscious into consciousness, which is equal to vocalization of the unconscious; more precisely, it is the decipherment of the hieroglyph inscribed in the unconscious. In Japanese, however, the "hieroglyph" is also present in consciousness. According to Lacan, in Japanese the distance from the unconscious to the spoken language is

⁷ Lacan, *Ekuri*, vol. 1 (the Japanese version of *Ecrits*), trans. by Miyamoto Tadao et al., Kōbundō, 1972.

palpable; thus there is no repression in Japanese. Because they always expose their unconscious (hieroglyph)—they are always telling the truth.

Lacan did not attempt to explain the Japanese mentality. He was interested in Japanese because their *écriture* points to the limit of psychoanalysis. It was in the same sense that Freud assessed the limits of psychoanalytic therapy in schizophrenics—or narcissistic neurotics, to use his own term—for whom the transference to the doctor does not occur. In this context, Lacan posed the concept of "foreclosure," which is distinct from repression—it is the foreclosure of primary repression, namely, of castration. Castration forms the subject by repression, causing the subject to be dogged by neurosis. On the other hand, the foreclosure of castration prevents the full formation of subject, causing psychosis (schizophrenia).

The difference between Korea and Japan that I have been dealing with should become clear vis-à-vis the psychoanalysis of literation. In Korea, castration became inevitable at the moment *kanji* was accepted. And the situation has not changed today, even though *kanji* has been abolished. Rather the struggle to abolish *kanji* was the result of the repression. This is a common phenomenon when one civilization encounters another, more advanced one.

Lacanian castration is the inevitable consequence of intervening in the symbolic order, namely, the world of articulated language (=culture). But things were different in Japan. The Japanese *kun-yomi* is a peculiar way of intervening in the symbolic order, without being totally internalized. In Japan, the foreclosure of castration occurred in the formation of *écriture*. If there is anything on earth that can be deemed Japaneseness, it is this system.

Innumerable accounts of Japan point out, for better or worse, the absence of the solid subject and axis of principle. In psychoanalytic terms, the Japanese case is more schizophrenia than neurosis. This characteristic, however, does not in the least indicate that Japan is a free society. We have to imagine a power driven not by repression but by foreclosure, a power that is not oedipal. This is the true mechanism of what Maruyama called the structure of the *Tennō* system.

This aspect of Japan has nothing to do with national mentality, ancient history, or an ahistorical essence of language. This analysis is different from so-called linguistic determinism—that which often neglects historicity. The three constitutive letters of Japanese—*kanji*, *hiragana*, and *katakana*—continue to exist and function. What should be truly surprising is that Japanese live in such a strange *écriture*, which is the very core of their whole politico-cultural apparatus. It is crucial to elucidate why and how this sustains such a repetitious compelling power.

This is just the first of step toward a psychoanalysis of Japan. To avoid any idealism that projects an essence of Japan—spirit, thought, culture, and self-identity—irrespective of its relationship with the external world, a consideration of Korea is indispensable for the consideration of Japan. The difference between Korea and Japan is not one of nations that have developed independently. As implied earlier, their development is inextricably tied to the geopolitical relations in the Far East, or more concretely, the disposition of the Chinese continent, Korean Peninsula, and Japanese Islands. I would like to suggest that this particular geopolitical relation has a universal significance in a world historical sense, aside from and despite its politico-economic influence on the present and future world and its compelling power to rewrite Western centrist world history.

In his *Eurocentrism*, Samir Amin questions the Western perspective of history from ancient Greece to the present.⁸ Ancient Greece, for instance, was an insular nation marginal to the advanced Egypt. Both of the two major trends in Western thinking; the poietic world view of Plato/Aristotle and the monotheistic faith in the Creator of Judaism derived from Egypt. Amin considered Egypt to be the origin, but not to stress the originality of Egypt nor because he was an Egyptian. According to Amin, while the cultural mechanism of an empire like Egypt tended to be rigid and stagnant because of the demands of sustaining its gigantic territory, Greece, a peninsular nation on the marginal coast, developed its own culture much more flexibly and freely. Furthermore, he saw an analogous relationship between the Roman Empire and Western Europe, Empires in Western Europe and insular England, and finally, between China and Japan. (To the list, I would like to add the relationship between Europe and a gigantic insular nation, the United States of America.)

In these marginal nations, or insulars in particular, energy is not consumed in order to sustain contours; anything can be introduced from outside and used to create something new, pragmatically and free from dogmas. Seen in this manner, almost all attributes of Japanness can be explained as being those of a marginal insular of Chinese civilization. Furthermore, this Japanness is nothing exceptional; it is just one of the universal phenomena in world history. From this viewpoint, Japanness should be compared with England rather than Germany, France, or China. And the most significant difference between England and Japan is that, while England is facing the European continent

⁸ Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism*, Monthly Review Press, NY, 1989.

directly across the channel, Japan has Korea between itself and the continent.

Because of its direct exposure to the continent, England has borne many foreign invasions, since even before the Norman Conquest; and the stains are still visible, for example, in its problems in Ireland. In contrast, Japan was protected. Various people immigrated to Japan since ancient times, but there have been no major military invasions: the Korean Peninsula has prevented China, Mongolia, and Russia from reaching Japan; Korea dammed up the military interventions. Mongolia, which had conquered the large territory from China to Arabia in the 14th century, fought for tens of years to rule the Korean Peninsula. It had to give up on Japan, not because of *Kamikaze* [God's wind] or typhoons, but because it had consumed all its might suppressing the resistance in Korea. And the barrier also worked the other way. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, a 16th century Japanese war lord, attempted to conquer the Ming but he had to give up his ambition because of the strong resistance he met in Korea.

The existence of Korea has definitely determined Japanese political and cultural formations, just as being in between China and Japan has determined Korea's. The *Tennō* system has survived in Japan not because of its deep mythological power, but simply because, thanks to Korea, Japan has never been ruled by foreign forces. Within the protected disposition, it so happened that every political power stabilized its rule by resorting to the authority of *Tennō*'s historical continuity, instead of seizing absolute hegemony under its own name. Japanese rulers and even the American Occupation Army appropriated *Tennō*'s authority. At the close of World War II, America had to stabilize Japan quickly in order to counter the USSR's strategy, and therefore it deliberately exempted *Tennō* from his war responsibility. Consequently, Japan revived as an economic superpower with the

"structure of the *Tennō* system" intact. Again, this is thanks to the existence of the Korean Peninsula. Because of this geography, the post-war Japanese constitution—represented by *Tennō* as "the symbol system" and the renunciation of ever again engaging in war—has survived. Had it not been for Korea as a defense against the advancement of China and USSR, it would have crumbled.

On the other hand, Korea's politico-cultural gestalt was determined by its disposition of being in-between China and Japan. That the existence of Korea explains why there has not been repression in Japan also has a flip side: In Korea there has been intense repression; the waves of invasions of foreign powers enforced repression, which then strengthened subjectivity. (This basic relational structure aside, if one considers the history of each nation individually first and then their reciprocity, one ends up hypostasizing cultural essences, as always.)

Korea, a marginal nation bordering on China and directly exposed to its political and cultural oppression, has developed a tendency toward principle and system, in a sense, much more so than China. A Korean literary critic, Che Onshiku recounted this tendency:

Frankly speaking, our intellectual history has contained a radicalist tendency resulting from certain irregularities. The intense seduction of a narrow minded ideological domination distinguishes orthodoxy and heresy, condemns as a rebel even the slightest deviation from the orthodox, and hastens to destroy it. Chon Ie (1587-1638) once deplored the situation: For Chinese scholars, there are orthodox studies, Zen and Tao. Some study Chu-tzu, while others study Wang Yang-ming. Indeed, paths of doctrines are not one. But in our nation, those who admire books and read them, be they intellectual or not, just memorize the lines of Chu-tzu as if it were the only doctrine. (. . .) Hearing the reputation that Chu-tzu's teaching is highly admired, they just pay it lip service in worship and

praise it in appearance. When there are no minor studies, how can an orthodox exist?"⁹

In fact it was the 16th century Korean scholars of the Li dynasty who, under an intense Confucianist policy, revived the doctrines of Chu-tzu, which had been long-since dying out in China. The Chu-tzuism that the Tokugawa Shogunate adopted as an official ideology was nothing other than this Korean version. Korean scholars who came to Japan as missionaries throughout the Tokugawa period (1603-1867) had taught it. After the Meiji Restoration, this scholastic rapport was forgotten. Even Maruyama Masao's *A Study of Japanese Political Thinking* ignored the Korean influence. (Later, in his introduction to the English edition, he amended this point.) Even China's Confucianism and Chu-tzuism were not as strict as those in Korea. Keeping this in mind, we finally realize that what Motoori Norinaga called the Chinese spirit [*kara gokoro*] was in fact the Korean spirit [*kara gokoro*].¹⁰ In any event, the objective of our pursuit should not be in the differences between Chinese, Korean, and Japanese thought, but the ways they were formed in their historical reciprocity.

What does this analysis tell us? That the relational structure in Far East that has heretofore been determined by the geo-political conditions will have to change, according to the new Far Eastern relational conditions. Furthermore, the structure can no longer be self-sufficient and enclosed within the Far East. The development of today's world capitalism, intercourse, and communication is

⁹ Che Onshiku, *Kankoku no Minzoku Bungaku Ron* (*National Literature of Korea*), Translated from Korean to Japanese by Aoyagi Yūko, (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1995)

¹⁰ In Japanese, the Chinese spirit—*kara* (唐) *gokoro* —and Korean spirit—*kara* (韓) *gokoro* —sound the same, although the characters used to write it are different.

changing the conditions—center and periphery vis-à-vis continent and coastal islands—that have until now been a natural given. Notwithstanding that forces to sustain the old structure within each nation are stubborn, they are gradually being undermined. In such a climate, conserving the structure of the *Tennō* system will not help Japan to survive in the coming globalized circumstances. Which is to say that Japanese culture can no longer sustain itself with Japanese *écriture* alone.