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Translating, Intertextualizing, and the “Borders” of “Japanese Literature”

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Recent discussions concerning the “borders” of “Japanese literature,” like those concerning the borders of other national literatures, have focused on relationships among languages and individual, cultural, and national identities. We have questioned how to categorize exophonic writing, that is to say creative texts by Japanese writers in languages other than their “native” Japanese (largely Chinese through the early twentieth century and European languages in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries).  
Likewise, we have interrogated how to classify translocal writing by Japanese, that is to say Japanese-language creative works written/published by Japanese outside Japan; we also have probed how to think about translingual writing, in this case literary texts published in Japan in languages other than Japanese. More controversially, and related to the latter, we have questioned how to categorize Japanese-language texts by so-called “non-Japanese.” This includes texts by writers for whom Japanese is a “native” language, such as Japanese emigrants who have become citizens of another country, zainichi (resident Korean) writers, and some children and occasionally grandchildren of Japanese emigrants. It also includes texts by writers who learned Japanese (relatively) voluntarily later in life, such as Ian Hideo Levy (1950–) and Yang Yi (1964–).  

1 Tawada Yoko (1960–), a native speaker of Japanese who has lived in Germany most of her adult life and published extensively in both Japanese and German, uses the term “exophony” to refer to those who “step outside of their mother tongue.” Reiko Tachibana, “Tawada Yoko’s Quest for Exophony: Japan and Germany,” in Doug Slaymaker, ed., Yoko Tawada: Voices from Everywhere (New York: Lexington Books, 2007), 153. See also Tawada Yoko, Ekusophon: bogo no soto e deru tabi (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003). For convenience, I use “Japanese” to refer to persons who identify themselves primarily as Japanese, and “Japanese language” to refer primarily to standard Japanese as defined by the Japanese Ministry of Education, as well as to regional dialects. Naturally, the constructed category “Japanese,” whether used to describe individuals, families, a society, a language, or a literature, hardly refers to a homogeneous entity. What we understand as the “Japanese language,” for instance, combines a number of situationally-based modes of expression. Moreover, xenoglossia (multilingualism, Sprachmischung [mixing languages]) is a hallmark of much “Japanese-language” literature. “Japanese-language” texts contain numerous “foreign” expressions, particularly English, but also Portuguese, Chinese, etc. Likewise, Japanese-language expressions are readily found in “foreign” languages/literatures. The term xenoglossia is taken from Suga Keijirō, “Translation, Exophony, Omniphony,” in Doug Slaymaker, ed., Yoko Tawada: Voices from Everywhere (New York: Lexington Books, 2007), 21-33; for more on the concept of Sprachmischung, see Claudio Guillén, The Challenge of Comparative Literature, Cola Franzen trans. (Cambridge: Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature, 1993), 272-273.  
2 Ian Hideo Levy was born in the United States, spent part of his childhood in Taiwan, and learned Japanese as a third language when living in Japan with his family as a teenager. He was nominated for the Akutagawa Prize in 1996. Yang Yi was raised in Harbin, China and first went to Japan in 1987 as a student knowing little Japanese; she has lived there ever since. In 2007 she won the Bungakukai prize for new writers and in January 2008 was nominated for the Akutagawa Prize. The most obvious early twentieth-century examples of writings in Japanese by those who learned the language relatively voluntarily are semicolonial Chinese who went to Japan for their educations and wrote some of their early texts in Japanese. The term “semicolonial” designates
it includes texts by writers who were forced to learn Japanese, particularly early twentieth-century Koreans and Taiwanese, some of whom continued to write in Japanese long after decolonization. These Japanophone texts, like their Anglophone, Francophone, Hispanophone, Lusophone, and Sinophone equivalents, severely undermine conventional understandings of national languages, not to mention national literatures. They, like exophonic, translocal, and translingual writings, are clear third spaces of literary contact nebulae best accompanied by question marks, not hyphens (e.g. Chinese? Japanese?, as opposed to Chinese-Japanese). Such nebulae/spaces force us to reconceptualize the global literary landscape as a dynamic site of intense transculturation characterized by transnational peoples and languages interacting with, struggling with, and transforming one another, rather than as collections of relatively disconnected literary worlds, each producing creative texts in separate languages.

But peoples and languages in motion tell only part of the story. Generally overlooked in discussions of how to reconstruct literary borders, or whether to abandon them entirely, are texts in motion, that is to say both traveling texts that are transculturated (translated, transculturally intertextualized) and the resultant transculturations themselves (translations, transcultural intertextualizations). In fact, translations are essential parts of literary corpora: both translations of texts into the language(s) associated with the literature in question and translations of texts originating in this literature/language. So, too, are transcultural intertextualizations: both the texts in this literature that intertextualize “foreign” creative works and those that are themselves intertextualized in other literatures. Together, translations and transcultural intertextualizations pull together so many literary worlds that adding them to literary corpora will require a massive

the multinational yet fragmented domination of China by Japan and numerous Western nations from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries.


4 Transculturation is best understood as the “many different processes of assimilation, adaptation, rejection, parody, resistance, loss, and transformation” of cultural products and cultures. Silvia Spitta, *Between Two Waters: Narratives of Transculturation in Latin America* (Houston: Rice University Press, 1995), 24. The Cuban sociologist Fernando Ortiz coined the term transculturation in 1940 in *Contrapunteo Cubano del Tabaco y el Azúcar* (La Habana: J Montero, 1940).

5 Transcultural intertextualization here refers to weaving “foreign” literary fragments into creative fabrics. Virtually all creative texts intertextualize literary predecessors, so it is important in this context to distinguish between transcultural intertextualizations and creative works that intertextualize predecessors from within their own literary/national boundaries, even though the latter often engage in transculturation themselves, transculturation taking place both within and across literary/national boundaries. Furthermore, predecessors from within literary/national boundaries often transculturally intertextualize “foreign” creative works.
redrawing of borders that may render the whole concept of borders, however flexible, nearly obsolete. But this is precisely the point.

To be sure, we long have discussed how translating and transculturally intertextualizing facilitate the cross-pollination of literary worlds. Moreover, scholarship on translation and transcultural intertextualization has boomed in recent years, particularly in discussions of empire. Many have examined the power wielded by translations penned by writers from imperial metropoles sympathetic to imperial discourse. That is, the ability of these translations—whether they are translations of texts by writers from the (former) metropole or from the (post)colony/semicolonial—to rationalize domination and to increase the attractiveness of empire. Others have looked at the translating of metropolitan literature by (post)colonial/semicolonial writers, an act that in many cases simultaneously reinforces, subverts, and wrests away cultural authority from the (former) imperial power. Similarly, the (post)colonial/semicolonial intertextual reconfiguring of canonical metropolitan works has received considerable attention, particularly the Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe’s (1930–) reworking of Joseph Conrad’s (1857–1924) novella *Heart of Darkness* (1902) in *Things Fall Apart* (1958), the South African writer J. M. Coetzee’s (1940–) reworking of Daniel Defoe’s (1660–1731) *Robinson Crusoe* (1719) in *Foe* (1986), the reconfiguration of Charlotte Brontë’s (1816–1855) novel *Jane Eyre* (1847) in the West Indian writer Jean Rhys’s (1890–1979) *Wide Sargasso Sea* (1966), and the Martinican writer Aimé Césaire’s (1913–) reworking of William Shakespeare’s (1564–1616) *The Tempest* (1611) in *Une tempête: d’après “La tempête” de Shakespeare: Adaptation pour un théâtre nègre* (A Tempest: Based on Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*: Adaptation for a Black Theater, 1969). Likewise, scholars have explored how writers from power centers intertextualize so-called “minor” literatures.

Yet despite such interest in processes of translation and transcultural intertextualization, we persist in marginalizing translations and confining transcultural intertextualizations to a single literary world. Translations generally are dismissed as derivatives of the same (national) literature as the texts they reconfigure, and rarely are they talked about as part of the literature(s) of the language they (the translations) employ. For instance, Chinese translations of the Japanese bestselling writer Murakami Haruki’s (1949–) novels, although bestsellers in China, are not discussed as parts of either Japanese or Chinese literature. Rather, they are celebrated for what

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8 The transcultural intertextualizing of such texts often is understood as a form of “writing back” to the (former) imperial power, that is to say undermining its cultural authority, but it also affirms such authority. See Karen Thornber, “Cultures and Texts in Motion: Negotiating and Reconfiguring Japan and Japanese Literature in Polytextual East Asian Contact Zones (Japan, Semicolonial China, Colonial Korea, Colonial Taiwan)” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2006) and Thornber, *Imperial Texts in Motion*.

their mere presence represents—Chinese obsession with Japanese cultural products despite political tensions between China and Japan. But in fact, by their very nature, translations belong to several literary worlds—the literary world of their source and the literary world associated with the language into which they are translated. That is to say, Chinese translations of Murakami’s oeuvre belong to both Japanese and Chinese literatures: they transculturize novels by a Japanese writer (and thus can be considered Japanese, albeit written in a language other than Japanese); they are in the Chinese language (and thus can be considered Chinese, albeit by a writer who is not Chinese).

Even more important, however, translations blur the very boundaries they expand, forming transcultural third spaces of literary contact nebulae. This is particularly apparent when translations are bestsellers and have considerable impact on local writers, as is the case with translations of Murakami in East Asia, but it is true even of translations consumed by only a handful. We might think of the first space as the literary world of the source text and the second space as the literary world associated with the language of the translation of the source text; the first and second spaces often are divided from each other, however artificially, along linguistic and political lines. The third space of translation overlaps with and eventually subsumes the first and second spaces. It is characterized not by hyphens (e.g. Japanese-Chinese) but by question marks (e.g. Japanese? Chinese?).

Transcultural intertextualizations, claimed by literatures different from the ones of the texts they intertextualize, likewise form third spaces of literary contact nebulae. Certainly, by their very nature, transcultural intertextualizations often assert if not solidify difference, separating themselves from the literary works they reconfigure and the textual worlds with which these literary works are associated. This is particularly true of postcolonial intertextual reconfigurations such as Foe, A Tempest, Things Fall Apart, and Wide Sargasso Sea. Yet these creative works also are contact nebulae with multiple question marks; they maintain strong enough ties to other literatures so as to challenge the assignation, at times seemingly their own, of a single identity. For instance, Yambo Ouologuem’s (1940–) highly intertextual Le Devoir de violence (Bound to Violence, 1968) is discussed as a key work of Malian Francophone literature. But the ties of Bound to Violence to the French writer André Schwarz-Bart’s (1928-2006) Le Dernier des justes (The Last of the Just, 1959), ties so close that Ouologuem has been accused of plagiarism, can make the designation “Malian Francophone literature” misleading. This novel is written in French by a person from Mali, making it Francophone literature from Mali, or Malian Francophone literature. But pulling in so much from other literary corpuses, it actually is so much more. Bound to Violence is better understood as “Malian? Francophone? French?”—a label that can expand or contract as needed. Without question, such a designation is clumsier than usual classifications, but it also captures more immediately the hybridity of the work in question. Nearly all creative texts engage in some way with textual predecessors from outside their immediate orbit, even if indirectly, by intertextualizing literary works from within their own literary spheres that themselves intertextualize foreign texts. Writers are among the most well-
read and well-traveled members of their societies. Dividing their creative output into national and linguistic categories so cleanly and with such authority does inadequate justice to the multiplicities of cultural production.

The need to reconceptualize if not abandon conventional literary boundaries is clearest in the case of reconfigurations of censored texts, texts that are more “complete,” if not texts that exist almost entirely, if only temporarily, in translation and transcultural intertextualization. But what happens at the opposite end of the spectrum, in the case of texts endorsed by authorities, particularly those that have wide readerships? Such creative works would seem to enjoy a stable position within a particular, most often national, literature. Yet their sheer popularity makes them prime targets for transculturation. Additionally, despite the acclaim they receive at home, these texts frequently meet with resistance abroad, and their translation and intertextualization is hardly straightforward. The pages that follow explore this phenomenon in (post)colonial/semicolonial East Asia, looking at Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese translations and intertextualizations of Japanese bestsellers including Shiba Shirō’s (Tōkai Sanshi, 1852-1922) political novel Kajin no kigī (Chance Meetings with Beautiful Women, 1885-1897), Tokutomi Roka’s (1868-1927) domestic novel Hototogisu (The Cuckoo, 1899), Hino Ashihei’s (1907-1960) battlefront trilogy Mugi to heitai, Tsuchi to heitai, and Hana to heitai (Wheat and Soldiers, Earth and Soldiers, and Flowers and Soldiers, 1938), and Kawabata Yasunari’s (1899-1972) novella Koto (Ancient Capital, 1962). Crucial here is reconceptualizing what we customarily think of as “Japanese literature” not only as a collection of texts written in Japanese that engage with Japanese and foreign predecessors but also as being a “predecessor” in its own right. I argue less that translations and transcultural intertextualizations of what we consider “Japanese literature” themselves be considered examples of “Japanese literature” than that we think of them, as well as their sources, as part of multiple literary corpuses, including Japanese. Ultimately, this means blurring if not eradicating, rather than expanding borders.

Transcultrating Late Nineteenth-Century Japanese Creative Discourse on East Asia

Both Shiba Shirō’s Kajin no kigī and Tokutomi Roka’s Hototogisu glorify late nineteenth-century Japan’s rise to power at the expense of East Asia, but the Chinese transculturations of these novels reveal the contradictions inherent in amending Japanese discourse on the region. They also highlight the importance of examining how texts circulate outside constructed linguistic and national borders and how, creating and embodying third spaces of literary contact nebulae, they defy such divisions.


12 Of course censored texts, at least those that are censored only in parts, are often themselves bestsellers. Moreover, many bestsellers have been self-censored by their authors and censored by their publishers, if not officially censored.
a) Beautiful Women, Tarnished Countries

*Kajin no kigii* is likely the first Japanese literary work in the modern period adapted or translated in East Asia, maybe even the world. Convention has it that the Chinese reformer Liang Qichao (1873-1929) read the novel as he was fleeing to Japan after the failed Hundred Days' Reform of 1898. Greatly impressed, and believing that writings of this sort would help push China to reform as they apparently had societies around the world, he began serializing *Jiaren qiyu* (Chance Meetings with Beautiful Women, 1898-1900), a Chinese translation of *Kajin no kigii*, two months after arriving in Tokyo.

Shiba Shirō's novel is the story of *Tokai Sanshi* (lit. Wanderer of the Eastern Seas), a young Japanese man visiting Philadelphia and its environs who strikes up friendships with two women, the Irish Koren (likely Colleen) and Spanish Yūran (likely Yolanda). Koren tells her new Japanese friend about English oppression of Ireland, while Yūran discusses her family's ordeals with corruption at the Spanish court and among Spanish reformers. Soon thereafter, attention turns to China, and Yūran's servant Fanqing (a homonym with “anti-Qing”) reveals that he came to the United States to escape Manchu (Qing) oppression but found that Americans discriminate heavily against Chinese. The novel describes the struggles of numerous nations against foreign oppression. Its exposés are frequently one-dimensional; together they divide the world into oppressed and oppressors, leaving little room for more ambiguous dynamics. On the other hand, the novel gives a panorama of contemporary world affairs and underlines the traumas the powerful are wont to inflict on places and peoples they deem inferior. Yet the political climate in Japan changed considerably between 1885, when Shiba Shirō began serializing *Kajin no kigii*, and 1897, when he completed the novel. The second half (Chapters 10-16), which dates from 1891, turns its back on concern for oppressed peoples and strongly advocates Japanese imperialism in East Asia. *Kajin no kigii*, the political novel that at first appeared to provide foundation stones for Chinese reform, soon became its Sisyphean nemesis.

*Jiaren qiyu* stands out among early intra-East Asian transculturations of foreign literature, most of which distanced themselves from their predecessors. A text that begins as a translation and concludes as an adaptation, Liang Qichao's version for the most part adheres to the first ten chapters of Shiba Shirō's novel but radically reworks the final sections. Notably, the Chinese translation reproduces Yolanda's celebration in Chapter 2:

Your country has reformed its government and, taking from America what is useful and tossing aside what isn't, now is steadily increasing its wealth and power. . . . Those who look at you are surprised and wipe their eyes. Those who hear of you are surprised and incline toward you. Just as the sun climbs in the eastern skies, so too is your country soaring in Asia. Your revered leader has given his people political freedom, and the people have sworn to follow him. . . . All people will be happy. Korea will send envoys. The Ryūkyū Islands will submit to your rule. The time then will come for you to do great things in East Asia. Your nation will take control and preside over an Asian alliance. In the East, people will no longer be in such danger. In the West, you will suppress the domination of England and France. In the South, you will tear up China's evil customs. In the North, you will foil Russia's schemes. You will oppose the policy of European countries to look contemptuously at East Asian peoples, interfering in their domestic affairs and making them subservient. Only your
country can provide the flavor of self-government and independence and spread the light of civilization.\(^{13}\)

In both the Japanese novel and its Chinese translation this passage opens the door for Japanese involvement in East Asian and world affairs. To be sure, *Jiaren qiyu* omits Yolanda’s reference to Chinese corruption and assumption of Japan’s responsibility for Chinese affairs. But little is done to mask the excision. In the Chinese text Yolanda talks about Japan’s future in the East, West, and North, which only calls attention to her silence concerning the South; significantly, the Chinese translator does not replace her disparaging words on China with laudatory remarks. Furthermore, the Chinese translation preserves the Japanese text’s rhetoric advocating Japanese guidance of the nations of East Asia, implicitly including China. The attempt to remove China from discussions of Japan’s rise to power is cursory at best.

Elsewhere the Chinese translation repeats, if not escalates, attacks on the Qing. It is true that, under pressure from leading Chinese intellectuals such as Kang Youwei (1858-1927), who believed Shiba Shiro’s diatribes against the Qing compromised reform efforts, Liang Qichao omitted much of the controversial material contained in the first part of *Kajin no kigī*.\(^{14}\) But he closely reproduced Chapter 10, where the Japanese novel not only chastises Koreans for being ungrateful for Japanese help but also criticizes Chinese for meddling in Korean politics, exposes Chinese crimes in Korea, and urges Japan to be uncompromising in its dealings with China.\(^{15}\) Overall, the first part of Liang Qichao’s text dampens the Chinese criticism of China voiced in his Japanese predecessor, but retains Japanese censure. The manipulation of *Kajin no kigī* implies that criticism is less dangerous when voiced by an exterior source than by a Chinese. It takes the position that outside censure should be censored only when it becomes overwhelming, but that there is no easy way to determine just when this becomes the case. In truth, outside censure in many cases enhances reform efforts.

The paradoxes inherent in amending Japanese discourse on China are brought to the forefront in the final six chapters of *Jiaren qiyu*, where the Chinese translator reconstructs Japanese attacks on Chinese policy toward Korea and Japan. Here he erases arguments both for China’s exit from Korea and for Japanese control of the peninsula, as well as the Japanese narrator’s critiques of the Qing. Significantly, such discourse is not replaced with reams of pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese rhetoric, suggesting the Chinese writer’s own ambivalence. The second half of *Jiaren qiyu* thus ironically depicts a less arrogant and antagonistic Japan than its Japanese predecessor. But it also portrays a China badly in need of reform. The challenge to the translator becomes particularly acute in the novel’s final chapter (Chapter 16), where the deletions pile up until the narrator finally abandons his text.\(^{16}\) Breaking away from the Japanese novel, Liang Qichao wraps up *Jiaren qiyu*:

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\(^{13}\) Tōkai Sanshi, *Kajin no kigī*, in *Meiji Taishō bungaku zenshū* vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shun’yōdō, 1930), 20-21; Liang Qichao, *Jiaren qiyu*, in *Yinbingshi heji, zhuanzi* vol. 35 (Shanghai, 1941), 14, and *Qing yi bao* vol. 1, no. 5 (December 21, 1898), *Qing yi bao quanbian* (Yokohama: Xinminshu, 1898-1901), 313.


\(^{15}\) See Yeh, “Zeng Pu’s ‘Niehai Hua,’” 159-160.

Originally, Korea was China's vassal state. It is the duty of the great power to restore order to the vassal state when things are chaotic. At that time, Korea was plagued by domestic trouble and foreign invasion. It sent a petition to China, asking for help. So it was only right for China to send troops to Korea. But Japan then was in the process of reinventing itself and was incredibly arrogant. Trying to test its strength, it was causing problems in East Asia. It saw that it could take advantage of the Qing court and mislead Koreans. It therefore supported Korea and launched hostilities against China. The Qing had no idea what was going on and thought that Japan was the same as before. . . . After three hundred years of peace, the generals did not know anything about troops, and the officers did not use commands. How could this corrupt and rotten, sick and old country compete against reborn Japan, a Japan cruel and savage but one with civilization and thought? Such differences in strength and knowledge. So China was first defeated in Korea, and then at Liaodong. It had to cede Taiwan and pay a huge indemnity. But we Japanese are much more ambitious than that. We still think that’s not sufficient. The triumvirate of Russia, Germany, and France suddenly intervened . . . [and the Japanese quickly retroceded Liaodong]. Many idealistic young men in the countryside censured their leaders for acting this way. They don’t yet know the pains of government.17

This finale reveals many of the conflicts facing early twentieth-century Chinese writers and other intellectuals as they struggled to reform their country without surrendering to Japanese propaganda, not to mention military and economic might. The narrator first poses a simple dichotomy: China is right and Japan is wrong. China did the right thing by helping Korea, while arrogant Japan, like a street bully, needlessly incited war. But then things become more complex. The narrator reveals that China’s leaders have no idea what is going on next door in Japan, much less in the world, and that this ignorance has dire consequences. Frustration with the Manchu court bubbles over: “How could this corrupt and rotten, sick and old country compete against reborn Japan?” Not that Japan is particularly admirable: it has “civilization and thought,” but far from taming the archipelago, these elements of modernity have made Japan even more brutal. Substantiating this claim and echoing many of the sentiments in Jiaren qiyu, the Japanese narrator announces, “We Japanese are much more ambitious than that. We still think that’s not sufficient.” Here the Chinese novel depicts the Japanese as a menacing force, one longing to take on the world. The novel refers to Western intervention after the ceasefire, reminding the reader that the only forces holding Japan back are the very ones preying on China. The Japanese received China’s Liaodong Peninsula as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) that concluded the Sino-Japanese War. But Japan was forced to give the peninsula back to China six days later under pressure from France, Russia, and Germany.

The Chinese adaptation/translation makes clear the need for internal reform if China is to survive. Confronting a conundrum characteristic of colonial/semincolonial struggles with literature from the metropole that discusses the colony/semicolony, the concluding passage of

Jiaren giyu makes it clear that Japan and the West remain dangerous forces whose designs on the mainland cannot be ignored.

b) The Cackling Cuckoo

The Japanese political novel provided an excellent window into imperial Japanese desire and served as an inspiration for Chinese reform, but its rhetoric could be sustained only up to a point. China’s engagement with this genre was short-lived; interest in more contemporary fare increased as larger numbers of Chinese studied in Tokyo and other Japanese cities. The first tsunami of Chinese students arrived in Japan in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), not long after the publication of Tokutomi Roka’s bestseller Hototogisu in 1899. Chinese readers quickly were sucked into Hototogisu mania, which by that point was spreading across the globe; in the years after its publication Hototogisu was adapted/translated into eleven languages, including Chinese and Korean, and was reworked multiple times for stage and screen. Hototogisu coincides with the Sino-Japanese War and is at once a celebration of Japan’s military prowess and a love story about the naval officer Takeo and his wife Namiko, a young woman dying of tuberculosis whose mother-in-law forces her out of the marital home. Takeo, who has been fighting with Japanese forces in China, returns to Japan to discover that his mother has divorced him from his wife. His further attempts to see Namiko are thwarted, with the exception of a momentary glimpse at a railway station. Namiko dies soon after this sighting, and Takeo does not make it to her deathbed in time, which adds even greater melodrama and pathos to her passing.

Early Chinese theatrical adaptations of Hototogisu took great liberties with Tokutomi’s novel. In his version, Ma Jiangshi, who had studied in Tokyo and was a member of China’s first modern drama troupe, transferred the action to Beijing, gave his characters Chinese names, and changed the dramatis personae. Most important, he omitted the novel’s battle scenes. The text that in Japanese intertwines threads of tragic romance with those of maritime warfare became a play focusing entirely on domestic traumas. As such, it spoke directly to increasing Chinese frustration with their own social structure, which left little room for individual choice. Lacking naval battle scenes, it was of course much easier to stage. But there are deeper implications. Ma Jiangshi’s play and others like it, underlining the damage Chinese convention inflicted on marital relationships, and on women in particular, were far from celebrations of China. On the other hand, sparing Chinese from having to watch their nation’s defeat, this play also masked the impact of these conventions not only on individual families but also on China’s ability to thwart foreign aggression and compete in the world arena.

Burugui (The Cuckoo, 1908), the translation of Hototogisu by the eminent Chinese translator Lin Shu (1852-1924) and his interpreter Wei Yi, offered no such protections. Unlike most Chinese and Korean translations and adaptations of Japanese literature, Lin Shu and Wei Yi’s text is based not on the Japanese version of the novel but on its first English translation, a relatively close permutation by Sakae Shioya and E. F. Edgett published in 1904. Further complicating matters was Lin Shu’s inability to read Japanese, English, or any foreign language; with the exception of several places where the text states explicitly “Lin Shu says . . .” the
Chinese translation does not specify which alterations to the Japanese novel via its English version were at Lin Shu’s instigation and which were the work of Wei Yi, although the distinction is not particularly important. What is notable is that for transposing this novel into Chinese—the only Japanese text out of more than one hundred creative works from eleven countries that he adapted/translated with the help of an interpreter—Lin Shu did not enlist (or at least did not admit to enlisting) the assistance of someone who could read the text in its original language. Considering the ever-increasing numbers of Chinese able to read Japanese after the Sino-Japanese War, and the fervor with which Chinese studying in Japan read *Hototogisu* and adapted it for the theater, Lin Shu’s choice is noteworthy. It perhaps stemmed from assumptions that the translation would be taken more seriously if it were associated with a Western configuration. But explicitly announcing on its first page that it is a retranslation of an English translation, albeit one penned in part by a Japanese (Shioya Sakae), rather than a direct translation from Japanese, pulls *Hototogisu* even farther out of Japanese hands. This undermining of Japanese narrative authority is no small move in the transculturation of a text that, while primarily a novel about the plight of young lovers separated by family and war, also highlights Japanese martial glory and Chinese defeat. For a late Qing transculturation, Lin Shu and Wei Yi’s *Burugui* is surprisingly faithful to its textual predecessors in spite of its multilayered sources. This novel reproduces not only their moving descriptions of Japanese losses and Chinese endurance, as would be expected, but also their portrayals of Japanese valor and Chinese weakness. Its struggles with how to address Chinese failures as well as Japanese attitudes toward China reveal the dilemmas facing many early twentieth-century colonial and semicolonial East Asian writers.

Toning down some of its predecessors’ military fanfare, *Burugui* portrays Chinese and Japanese in a different light from the English and Japanese versions of the novel. For instance, in the first part of both Roka’s *Hototogisu* and its English translation Japanese troops arrive in Hong Kong “to great cheers” from a crowd of presumably mixed ethnicity, but *Burugui* makes no mention of cheers, noting only that the local Japanese population “surged down to the sea to welcome them.” The crowd has lost its diversity, suggesting that only Japanese would be excited to see Japanese troops. Moreover, their greeting is not vocalized; the sound of cheers has been muted. At times, the Chinese translation excises Roka’s militaristic flourishes. Describing a decisive battle between Chinese and Japanese forces on the Yellow Sea, the Japanese narrator and his English translator exuberantly speak of the waves boiling and foaming around the ships like huge serpents coiling around a giant whale. The Chinese narrator declines the opportunity to translate this flowery metaphor and instead jumps to a straightforward description of troop movement. Similarly, whereas *Hototogisu* depicts the war as ending “just like a great bird settling its wings,” and the English translation gleefully announces, “the war ended with the

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impressiveness of an eagle gathering its wings for flight," Burugui states simply, "the fighting ended."

The translators' additions are also important. In regular type but indented, or squeezed between sentences in smaller print than the main narrative, they stand out in a novel without paragraph breaks. The added material variously explains, contradicts, and editorializes, allowing Burugui to draw attention to what it perceives as the strengths but more frequently the shortcomings of its source. For instance, the translator interrupts the novel's discussion of the final days of the war, when Chinese positions were falling rapidly, to let readers know that "China's stalwarts [zhuangshi] remember" this or that event. Burugui does not deny the Japanese account, but it does depict Chinese as more than shadows engulfed by what the Japanese and English Cuckoos refer to as the "tide of the Japanese Imperial Army." More significant is how the added remarks rewrite both intratextual and extratexual discourse; for instance, the translators' comment that the return of the Liaodong Peninsula to China after the 1895 Triple Intervention is "China's shame." Especially telling is the way this remark offsets contemporary Japanese claims to shame at "losing" the peninsula. As Marius Jansen has noted, "The indemnity [3 million yen to Japan to defray its war costs, which ultimately broke the Qing treasury] was increased in partial compensation, but no amount of payment could make up for the sense of outrage and humiliation that was left by the 'Triple Intervention.' An imperial rescript exhorted Japanese to remain calm and diligent in adversity." Contradicting Japanese claims of chagrin, Burugui asserts that the shame rests solely on China's shoulders; Western nations were meddling in Japanese affairs, but the Chinese were even more at the mercy of foreign powers. In fact, China's shame was less the return of the peninsula than its having been ceded in the first place, that is to say, the ease with which the Liaodong Peninsula was tossed around among countries at the Shimonoseki peace conference earlier that year. This is only one of several instances where the Chinese translators' comments spin both intratextual and contemporary phenomena.

Burugui not only aroused sympathy for a young Japanese couple, tugging on the heartstrings of empathic readers who themselves likely had experienced the traumas of an oppressive family system. It also provided Chinese with an explicitly mediated window on a bestselling Japanese version of Japanese victory and Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. In the opening lines of his preface, Lin Shu remarks that Burugui—depicting the tragedies of young lovers preyed upon by cruel elders—is one of the most heartwrenching of the more than sixty texts he has so far translated. Critics have latched onto this comment as a sign of Lin Shu's great appreciation for the book he was translating. Overlooked has been Lin Shu's quick segue to war, advising readers that passages in the novel also discuss hostilities "in great detail" and then spending the next pages, not lines, detailing the war and its implications. Lin Shu calls on Chinese to learn from what has happened and reveals great concern with the nation's future.

22 Tokutomi, Hototogisu, 397; Nani-ko, 283; Burugui, 55.
23 Tokutomi, Burugui, 55.
24 Tokutomi, Hototogisu, 397; Nani-ko, 283.
25 Tokutomi, Burugui, 55.
27 See also Lin Shu's remarks several chapters earlier, following the lengthy scene of the battle on the Yellow Sea, where he speaks of the violence of battle and talks about his translation of Hototogisu. Tokutomi, Burugui, 27-28.
laments that he is already old, that there is little time for him to "dedicate my life to the country." But this novel is a beginning: may its sincere shouts, he pleads, rouse his compatriots. Lin Shu and Wei Yi’s recasting of Roka’s *Hototogisu* highlights the paradoxical problems of adapting and translating in contexts of significantly uneven power relationships.

Imperial China’s decline, precipitated by domestic turmoil and pressures from abroad, began decades before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Although Huang Zunxian (1848-1905) and other nineteenth-century Chinese intellectuals, well aware of Japan’s increasing strength, had urged Chinese to look more closely at their neighbors to the east, it was not until Japan’s military victory that Chinese leaders believed it fundamentally important to take it seriously. This monumental change in intra-East Asian cultural, political, and social dynamics, manifested most vividly by the arrival of Chinese students on Japan’s shores in the early twentieth century, resulted in increased Japanese arrogance and Chinese feelings of inferiority. Chinese transculturations of Shiba Shirō’s *Kajin no kigū* and Tokutomi Roka’s *Hototogisu*, by revising, excising, and adding words and passages, interrogated but did not dismiss Japanese rhetoric, particularly on China. Certainly, most transculturations of Japanese literature, whether intra-East Asian or from further afield, had an agenda. But the implications of these revisions were particularly powerful in a nation of failed reforms and increasing submission to powers around the world, and in an East Asia still shaking from Japan’s unexpected victories over regional and global powers.

*Kajin no kigū* and *Hototogisu* conventionally are understood as Japanese novels, while *Jimēn qiyu* and *Bumgui* are marginalized as their respective translations. Such classifications are not inaccurate. But they tell only part of the story. Thinking of all four of these novels as third spaces, as contact nebulae, as at once Japanese? Chinese? and Chinese? Japanese? better captures their incessant motion and inherent transculturation.

**Sanctioned Hits: Hino Ashihlei’s Battlefront Trilogy in China/Chinese and Korea/Korean**

Chinese and Korean translations of Hino’s bestselling battlefront trilogy likewise challenge Japanese discourse on East Asia while blurring boundaries among East Asian literary worlds. Chinese produced two translations of *Mugi to heitai* and one of *Tsuchi to heitai* in the late 1930s. Even more remarkably, in the late 1930s and early 1940s Koreans translated parts of Hino’s trilogy as well as numerous other Japanese battlefront texts despite injunctions against publishing in Korean. As was true of Ishikawa’s (semi)colonial translators, some of Hino’s (semi)colonial translators justified their engagement with his texts by arguing that they exposed the “truths” of war. For instance, in the preface to his translation of *Mugi to heitai* the Chinese translator Wu Zhefei admitted that the novel’s exposure of Japanese brutality was not nearly as

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29 The anti-Japanese press Shanghai zazhishe published the first—an abridged version by Wu Zhefei (*Mai yu bingdai*, Wheat and Soldiers)—in December 1938; the collaborationist press Manzhouguo tongxinshe chubanbu published *Maitianli de bingdai* (*Soldiers in Wheatfields*), a more complete translation by Xue Li in March 1939. In 1939 Beijing’s Dongfang shuju published *T11 bing* (*Earth and Soldiers*), Jin Gu’s translation of *Ts11chi to heitai*.
30 Between March 1939 and February 1941 the Korean literary journal *Munjang* (Writing) ran the “Chŏnsŏn munhak sŏn” (Selections of Battlefront Literature) series, which included passages from Hino’s trilogy in Korean translation, some of which were themselves taken from *Pori wa pyŏngchŏng*, the Japanese official Nishimura Shintarō’s Korean translation of *Wheat and Soldiers*, published in 1939 under the directive of the Japanese governor general in Korea.
illuminating as what was available in Ishikawa’s *Ikiteiru heitai*. Even so, he claimed, he translated *Mugi to heitai* because it “objectively, albeit inadvertently, records the truth” and that “as a living record, the diary of a march, it certainly will contribute a lot to our understanding of resistance.” His publishers similarly emphasized the novel’s adherence to facts: “Although the Japanese author does his utmost to exaggerate the supposed ‘courage’ of the ‘imperial army,’ *Wheat and Soldiers* exposes the atrocities of the Japanese army, how they treat prisoners and ravage the people; on the other hand, it shows even more clearly the courage of the Chinese army. In this novel we see much of the ‘truth of the enemy population.’”

This emphasis on truth points to real anxiety concerning the implications of disseminating Japanese cultural products in China and Korea. Japanese literature was irresistible, but justifying its consumption, much less reconfiguration, was hardly straightforward. Even more significant, translations of this literature, far from being faithful reproductions, often were complex hybrids that significantly rewrote their Japanese source texts. Some openly omitted material via strings of dots or other editorial marks; others, like those in the “Chōnson munhak sŏn,” rewrote only several pages of their Japanese source. The Japanese “truth” of the battlefield was not something ingested whole and indeed was reconfigured for (semi)colonial consumption.

Interestingly, Korean translations of Hino’s trilogy tend to draw attention to the humanness and humanity of Japanese soldiers. More than celebrating or denouncing Japanese imperialism, the selections translated in “Chōnson munhak sŏn” highlight the human bonds uniting Japanese soldiers with their families and even with Chinese civilians. The narrator of *Hana to heitai* describes his experiences while guarding Hangzhou, south of Shanghai. Significantly, the passage from *Hana to heitai* translated in *Munjang*, titled “Chŏnchang ŭi chŏngwŏl” (New Year’s on the Battlefield), depicts Japanese soldiers as anxious not about their next military move but about how they will mark the New Year so far from home. *Hana to heitai* and “Chŏnchang ŭi chŏngwŏl” both begin:

> The seed of our headaches was wondering how we soldiers would celebrate the approaching New Year on this battlefield. We weren’t worried about how we would fight off the attacking devils who got in the way of our festivities. What was bugging us on the dark battlefield desolated by the fires of war were doubts that we really would be able to eat [traditional New Year’s treats] on New Year’s.

The texts then veer from the availability of food to the movement of troops, with the narrators describing the Japanese arrival in snowy Hangzhou, but attention soon returns to the soldiers pondering how they will ring in the New Year. “Chŏnchang ŭi chŏngwŏl” wraps up with the soldiers realizing that because there has been no sign even of letters from home, they have virtually no chance of receiving packages of the desired treats. By focusing on Japanese soldiers’ strong ties to home—pointedly not to Japan as the imperial power but to their families, with whom they ordinarily would be enjoying New Year’s delicacies—then ending immediately

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before the Japanese narrator details troop movements, the Korean translation of *Hana to heitai* evokes sympathy for men away from home during the holidays. The selections from Hino’s *Mugi to heitai* that appear in the journal *Munjang* also draw attention to strong familial bonds threatened in wartime. Written as a series of diary entries, *Mugi to heitai* centers on Hino’s experiences in and around Xuzhou in May 1938, including the bloody Battle of Xuzhou. The novel portrays the hardships faced by courageous Japanese soldiers and discusses the sacrifices they make for their homeland; it also expresses sympathy for the Chinese and raises doubts about the validity of war. Notable, then, is the inclusion in *Munjang* of the narrator’s May 17 diary entry, where he pulls out some pictures of his family. He informs his companions that his father and mother “are the best in Japan,” that his wife “is the most beautiful in the world,” and that his children “are geniuses and prodigies.” Here the warrior is simply a proud son, husband, and father, a very human figure.

Korean translators did not stop with strong intrafamilial bonds, also choosing selections of Japanese battlefront literature that highlight friendships among Japanese soldiers and speak even of their compassion toward the enemy. In fact, launching the “Chŏnsŏn munhak sŏn” is the translation of the passage in *Tsushi to heitai* where the narrator and his men discover that Chinese troops have attacked Chinese civilians; those who survived the onslaught now are moaning painfully by the road, their children screaming inconsolably. The Japanese narrator twice leaves the trenches, risking his life to comfort a dying Chinese woman and her infant. This passage, translated faithfully from the Japanese, establishes an ironic contrast between Chinese and Japanese soldiers: Chinese soldiers murder Chinese civilians, whereas Japanese soldiers are deeply moved by their plight and risk their lives to give them dignity in death. In Hino’s novel, the depiction of Japanese kindness toward Chinese attacked by Chinese is balanced by references to the Japanese murder of Chinese and Chinese murder of Japanese; in *Munjang*, on the other hand, this scene stands apart, setting a compassionate tone for the journal’s “Chŏnsŏn munhak sŏn.”

What led to the choice of such episodes? Hino’s wartime trilogy was hugely popular in Japan and embraced by Japanese authorities, so it is unlikely the anonymous translator(s) were concerned with censorship. If the goal was to propagandize for Japan, passages highlighting Japanese military glory and depicting Chinese as welcoming Japanese soldiers would have been more obvious choices. And if the translator(s) were critical of Japanese imperialism, Hino’s trilogy includes a number of passages that likely would have been more appealing. Motivations are impossible to determine and in fact tell us little about what texts are/actually do. Regardless of the intent of the translator(s), the translations make the Japanese “enemy soldiers” appear less formidable.

In fact, the Korean translators of Hino’s trilogy at times chose passages that explicitly depict Japanese soldiers as naïve and ineffective. The second installment of “Chŏnsŏn munhak sŏn” includes “Chŏkkchŏn sangryuk” (Landing in the Face of the Enemy), a translation of Hino’s description in *Tsushi to heitai* of Japanese troops stumbling onto Chinese soil. Far from composed and primed for action, the Japanese troops—who have been traveling for weeks—slog blindly ashore; despite having gone through numerous drills, they are woefully ill-prepared for

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the realities of the battlefield: “The water was muddy. We couldn’t see land anywhere. And the bullets didn’t come. Someone behind me said that the enemy must not be around.” Ordered to jump off the boat, the troops find themselves in frigid water that rises above their knees, their feet sinking deep into the mud. The narrator continues, “We had no idea where the shore was, and no idea where the enemy was. Conditions were completely different from what we’d been told on the boat and from what we’d imagined.” The Japanese troops hear bullets, but “none came our way, so for a moment we thought they weren’t firing at us.” They are startled when seconds later embankments, trees, and steel towers suddenly appear before them, and bullets begin whizzing by. It is true that this initial attack does not deter the Japanese, who almost immediately begin carving out a path of destruction. The Korean translation winds down with the narrator’s remark that the Japanese troops set fire to every house in sight, correctly believing them repositories of Chinese troops and ammunition. But the final line of “Chŏkchŏn sangryuk”—“it started to rain”—opens the possibility that these fires might be short-lived. In *Tsuchi to heitai*, on the other hand, houses continue to burn despite the rain, and the body count rises: “Here and there straw houses were burning, sending up fiery dark-red smoke. And in front of the burning houses were fallen Chinese soldiers.” Even more important, Japanese troops continue their advance. The translations of Hino’s novels in *Minjung* do not replace rhetoric on Japanese military might with that on Chinese, much less Korean strength, but by exposing Japanese compassion and incompetence they nevertheless leave room for Chinese victory and thus presumably Korean independence. After all, these texts suggest, Japanese soldiers are only human.

Along these lines, translations of battlefront literature at times gloss over Chinese losses. The silence of Bai Mu’s Chinese translation of Ishikawa Tatsuzō’s *Ikiteiru heitai* concerning the Nanjing massacre is the most blatant example, but similar inclinations are evident in such texts as *Mai yu bingdui*, Wu Zhefei’s Chinese translation of Hino’s *Mugi to heitai*. For instance, at one point Hino’s narrator states that a Japanese battalion crushed the 3,000 Chinese they encountered near Zhaojiaji (in Hebei province, Northern China), and that the survivors fled, leaving behind 500 corpses. In contrast, the Chinese version mentions that there were 3,000 Chinese near Zhaojiaji but deletes the part about dead bodies lying in the fields. *Mai yu bingdui* even deletes references to Japanese thirst for Chinese blood, omitting the Japanese narrator’s remark, following his musings on the soldiers’ families (which is repeated in the Chinese version): “I wanted to charge with my men. I was consumed with violent hatred toward the Chinese soldiers who so tormented my compatriots and threatened my life. I wanted to charge with my men, and with my hands attack the enemy soldiers, and kill them.”

It is true that some translations of Hino’s trilogy, including *Tu yu bing*, Jin Gu’s Chinese translation of *Tsuchi to heitai*, reproduce even their Japanese source’s most gruesome images of destruction at the hands of the Japanese. Similarly, while *Mai yu bingdui* deletes Hino’s depictions not only of Chinese thanking Japanese for bringing peace to East Asia but also of

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37 Hino, *Tsuchi to heitai*, 61; “Hŏlk kwa pyŏngdae,” 177.
41 Hino, *Tsuchi to heitai*, 69.
Japanese patriotism, *Tu yu bing* faithfully translates such scenes. There is no easy way to classify (semi)colonial Chinese and Korean translations of Hino’s trilogy, much less those of Japanese literature more generally. But there is little question that translations of Japanese literature, like those of other literatures, are a vital part of early twentieth-century East Asian literary history and ultimately of the literatures of China, Japan, and Korea. Blurring and obliterating borders, they are powerful reminders that even under the extreme condition of armed hostilities between nations, transculturated texts and their transculturations claim third spaces, contact nebulae that survive and even flourish among bullets and bombs.

Cultural Capital(s) and Literary Boundaries

Intra-East Asian literary transculturation slowed in the immediate aftermath of World War II. But since the 1960s, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese have been translating and intertextualizing one another’s creative works in earnest. Kawabata Yasunari’s novella *Koto* (Ancient Capital, 1962)—translated and intertextualized multiple times in China and Taiwan—is emblematic of the intense transculturation that characterizes literary consumption and production in contemporary East Asia. One of the three creative works for which Kawabata became the first East Asian writer to win the Nobel Prize in literature (1968), *Koto* is the story of a young woman separated from her twin sister at birth and briefly reunited with her years later. Kawabata’s novella interweaves personal struggles with lyric and factual descriptions of Kyoto and its many temples, shrines, and festivals. In contrast, the contemporary Taiwanese writer Zhu Tianxin’s (1958-) novella of the same title (*Gudu*, Ancient Capital, 1996) reconfigures the confrontations with bloodline depicted in Kawabata’s novella as confrontations with both cultural identification and physical and literary space. The narrator of *Gudu* is a second-generation Chinese mainlander in Taiwan, a 1990s flaneur of both Taipei and Kyoto, and a reader of Japanese literature and maps. Disoriented in contemporary Taipei, she portrays Kyoto as a more desirable city, a place she feels at home, with its “twin”—colonial Taipei—a close if ambivalent second. At the same time that it venerates Japan’s cultural capital (Kyoto), in part because it is a repository of things Chinese, *Gudu* severely compromises Japanese cultural capital in the Bourdieuan sense.

The shuffled citations from *Koto*, brief snippets in no particular order, signify *Gudu*’s—and in effect the postcolonial—subordinating of a locally and internationally venerated Japanese cultural product. Citing Kawabata’s final lines well before its own conclusion, *Gudu* points to the inadequacies of the Japanese narrative in guiding the Taiwanese project; there is, Zhu Tianxin’s novella implies, much more to say, much additional ground to be covered. The narrator of the Taiwanese *Gudu* thus boldly cuts apart a literary work that is flourishing, indeed multiplying, outside its country of origin; by the time Zhu Tianxin published her novella, *Koto* had been translated into Chinese at least six times, and it has remained a popular object of reconfiguration into the twenty-first century.

*Gudu*, the narrator declares, is the Taiwanese “old [textual] capital,” not the Japanese book (Kawabata’s *Koto*) parading around in Chinese clothes (translations under the name *Gudu*). Like many intertextualizations and translations, *Gudu* asserts its independence from its titular predecessors, both Japanese and Chinese. But in so doing, in creating with them a third

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space, a literary contact nebula, it ultimately acknowledges their interdependence. In fact, no text stands completely alone, disconnected from predecessors, contemporaries, and successors. And the more we look into the deep intertwining of texts, and indeed of literary worlds, brought about by peoples, languages, and texts in motion, the more glaring the artificiality of conventional categories and the more imperative the need to understand cultural products as constantly moving, transforming entities, not as static artifacts in dusty archives that are best classified and examined along linguistic/cultural/national lines.